
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REVISED DRAFT (to be declassified after approv

SUPPLIMENT TO STATUS REPORT OF 1 DECEMBER 1948 - 31 MODERN 1948



It can be assumed that propaganda includes psychologic I warfare and information programs; but the U.S. began dorid or a without a clear theory for U.S. propaganda. The "Strategy of Truth," the policy of telling the truth, was a gradual development, and was undoubtedly sound. Primary attention was given to the expression and formulation of National Policy.

The means for implementation of national policy may be subdivided into four major categories: political, economic, additional propaganda.

Political means are involved with the institutional at the the idealogical conflicts in the Western nations among societies, groups, institutions between Western Democracy and soviet I memunism. Among the four means cited, the 'lines of battle' has different. Political lines are within the U.S. and nations clearly akin to the U.S. Economic lines, essentially denial and sapply are synonymous with the "Trop Curtain." Military lines (in tise of war) are quite clearly defined. Propaganda lines apoult be

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within the confines of the adversary in peace and war. It is in less to employ one means of implementation alone without the orders.

Although the United States has used each of them separ hand at times, all of them are being used together now, conditioned by the fact that military means are not being used to their fully effect. The Marshall Than exhibits an excellent coordination of economic, political and military elements, with certain weak measure still showing up in the use of the propaganda element. The colleger at term that allocates changes in qualitative relationships between states - is being carried out on every level at the present time. It is not just a balancing of tea cups. It includes

- (a) Development of political, economic, military, and proming and relations between states:
 - (b) Coordination of the same relations;
 - (c) Development of a consept of manipulation.

In addition to this coordination of elements, there is a development of the consect of manipulation which the Russia & constant to the superficient view, it should be easier to be effective along these times in the American society than in the Russian. Monolitic societies and the Russians, all move in one direction without the interior of ticity essential to effective manipulation of policy; at these using a sledge harmer to crack a peanut. The problem here is a see how the four categories - political, economic, military proper gands - can be coordinated in the manipulation of a particular

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problem, in order to implement a policy once you have one stands.

In the operations of OWI, the State Department was not the sole repository of political policy, nor can it be. There we . also the President, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Theater Commanders, who in the very nature of things could not evoid making what amounted to political decisions. Himes you must have a policy in order to use propaganda, you must also have what that policy means. If you receive policy at only one plant, that policy will be affected by the nature of the place is self. It will either be political minded or military mindet. to have rounded out pelicy, you must have a common intellectus basis of policy among the people who make it. It is also redered sary to keep a check and balance during the development of printer ganda expressing policy to make sure that it isn't contractours. The mainspring of policy in the U.S. must be the top politica. civilian policy making body. This may not be the State Department alone; neither can it be the Military Establishment alone: i. must be the top political policy making body of the governmen.

The great difficulty has always been in gett_ing that policy through to the people who will apply it in the propagands 'ie......

In World War II, OWI had to obtain policy in a haphasard f same.

It was able to get it one way or another and was able even to suggest acceptable bases of policy but the relationships b twenty policy making and propagands making were never clearly defined.

The real difficulties arose in fields of military operation.
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where, in some instances, there was a very strong tendency to formulate policy on the spot without recurse to the national mainsprings of policy. Sometimes this was unavoidable, bu it must be said that Theater Commanders have not been brought up with respect for political policy on this level as they ha fe policy on the levels of their own function. This was a ma or problem in World War II and is a major problem in any future was in which the U.S. may be engaged. It may require a very high level policy officer on the staff of the Theater Communder Thank is not necessarily an unchangeable situation. Because Theater Commanders sometimes forgot the broader aspects of mational policy, this does not mean that a new point of view can not be evolved her produce a common intellectual basis of understanding of the function of national political pelicy in war. This cannot be solved on the basis of a chain of command. It needs a common indoctrination of those men who will develop into positions of command. Facally of their training in conveying ideas, good planning people for psychological warfare are successful playwrights and journalists.

The information facilities of the State Department should a expanded to include the National Military Establishment in warther. A peacetime nucleus is needed which will expand for war. I to a OWI two years to establish credibility within the U.S. gove now in World War II.

One thing we must learn: to state the U.S. case in terms (F)

USSR concepts; only in this way will we be assured of some reasons

of understanding and acceptance. The four major thoses of

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
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psychological warrare are love, hate, fear, hope; hope being the most powerful and the one most widely used by the Soviet stove 'make.....

Propaganda also has domestic aspects in war. The interests of the home front and its relation to overseas propaganda can not be neglected. Both operations must stem from a common policy at the top.



OF 1 DECEMBER 1944 - 1 DECEMBER 1944



National policy can be implemented in four different ways ... by military, economic, political and propaganda means. lol. tical methods are used in the struggle between nations viewed as nstitutions. It is useless to use just any one of these, each supports the other. Although the United States has used each of them separately at times, all of them are being used together non, conditioned by the fact that military means are not being used to their full effect. The Marshall Plan exhibits an excellent comme dination of economic, political and military elements, with certain weaknesses still showing up in the use of the propagates of smert. The cold war - a term that allocates changes in qualitative related tionships between states - is being carried out on every level his the present time. It is not just a balancing of tea cups. addition to this coordination of elements, there is a devel openit of the concept of manipulation which the Russians are carrying on : on the highest levels. Contrary to the superficial when, it therein be easier to be effective along these lines in the American section than in the Russian. Monolithic societies such as the Russians. all move in one direction without the interior elasticity assential

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COPY NO.

STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE FOR SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS

STATUS REPORT

1 December 1948 - 31 December 1948

I - MEMBERSHIP OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE No change

II - MEETINGS

During this period the Subcommittee held eight regular meetings.

III - CONSULTANTS

At its regular meeting on 14 December the Subcommittee ret. with Mr. George E. Taylor, former Deputy Director for OWJ in charge of Pacific Operations, Director, Far Eastern Institute, University of Washington and on temporary duty with the latitus War College.

IV - WORK IN PROGRESS

No change: Drafting Transitional Plan for Overt Psychologiacal Warfare (See Status Report for October 1948).

V - WORK COMPLETED

Initial Emergency Action for Overt Psychological War are (SANACC 304/17). On 28 December 1948 the Subcommittee submitted the above document to SANACC for consideration.

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STATE-ARMY-NAVY-AIR FORCE COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE FOR SPECIAL STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS

STATUS REPORT

1 November 1948 - 30 November 1948

I - MEMBERSHIP OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

No change.

II - MEETINGS

During this period the Subcommittee held three regular meetings, and one Special Meeting.

III - PUBLICATIONS NOTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE

"Civil Defense for National Security", a report to the Secretary of Defense by the Office of Civil Defense Planning.

IV - WORK IN PROGRESS

No change: Drafting Emergency Measures. (See Status Feport for October 1948).

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